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Abstract 
This study compared the sociomoral reasoning of 7-, 9-, 12-, and 15-year-old children and 
adolescents of two collectivistic cultures in the 1990s: Spain (horizontal collectivism; N = 
208) and Russia (vertical collectivism; N = 247). Participants reasoned about choices and 
moral justifications of a protagonist in a sociomoral dilemma where participants can focus 
on different moral and non-moral concerns (e.g., going with their best friend, going with a 
new classmate or trying to do something with both). Results support previous research in 
western societies: Participants tend to choose the option “visiting the best friend”, and self-
interest tends to decrease with age whereas altruism tends to increase. Moreover, Spanish 
participants tended to consider all parties involved in the dilemma (i.e., old friend and new 
classmate), whereas Russian participants did not. These results are discussed in light of their 
differences as horizontal and vertical collectivistic societies. Overall, the results open an 
avenue for new studies when comparing the effects of culture on children’s and adolescents’ 
development. 
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Sociomoral Reasoning in Children and Adolescents from Two Collectivist Cultures 
Most of children’s bedtime stories and tales teach a moral lesson on what is right and 
just. Often these stories (e.g., little red-riding-hood) depict a moral choice in which the 
protagonist has to make a decision (e.g., obeying parents’ norms vs. doing what they wish) 
and face possible consequences (e.g., get to the grandmother’s house safely, being eaten by 
a wolf). Thus, children start reasoning and learning about moral behaviour and possible 
moral dilemmas, and whether morality is based on the principle of justice (i.e., 
understanding of moral duties or obligations) or the principle of solidarity or care (i.e., 
understanding others’ feelings). Already Kant (1781/1979) differentiated between “negative 
moral duties” (e.g., promise-keeping, truth-telling) that are obligatory for and owed to 
everybody, and “positive moral duties (e.g., helping, benevolence), that regulate 
sympathetic concern, empathy, and altruism which we do not owe to everybody equally. 
Kohlberg’s (1984) theory based morality on the principle of justice or the understanding of 
negative moral duties. Research on the development of positive moral duties (e.g., 
Eisenberg, 1986) has shown that even young children are able to anticipate the 
psychological consequences of moral violation for the feelings of others, the self, and for the 
relationship. Studies by social domain theory (e.g., Turiel, 1983) found that preschool 
children have a genuine moral understanding that goes beyond obedience to authority and 
cost-benefit calculations.  
Friendship has been regarded as a special relationship where people have to integrate 
knowledge about positive and negative moral duties (Turiel, 1983), as it involves 
understanding of the moral rules governing this relationship and being concerned about each 
other’s welfare (Keller, 2004). Through establishing and maintaining intimate friendships, 
children come to comprehend and emotionally share the perspective of another person, 
which is a prerequisite for morally mature cognitions and behavior (Keller, 2004).  
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Friendship, and moral reasoning about friendship, is influenced by cultural beliefs, 
as interactions between friends are based on culture-specific social norms and perceptions 
(Chen, French & Schneider, 2006). Keller and collaborators (1998) interviewed children (7, 
9 years) and adolescents (12, 15 years) in Iceland and China about a friendship dilemma 
where the main character has promised to visit his/her best friend. Later, the protagonist 
receives an attractive invitation from another classmate (going to the last showing of a 
movie and having pizza afterwards for children; going to a pop concert for adolescents). 
Several issues complicate the situation: The friends have known each other for a very long 
time, they always meet on the same day, and the friend does not like the new classmate. The 
friend wants to show a new toy or CD to the protagonist but also wants to talk about 
something important. The new classmate just moved to the area and does not have friends 
yet (Keller, 2004; Keller, et al. 1998). Participants were asked to reason about what the 
protagonist decided to do (practical decision) and what was the right thing to do in that 
situation (moral judgment). Results showed a complex interaction of moral development 
and culture. Choosing the option “old friend” increased with age across cultures. When 
reasoning about their choices, across ages, the majority of Chinese participants emphasized 
the moral quality of close friendship as a reason for choosing the “old friend”, whereas 
reasons referring to promise-keeping increased with age in China. Conversely, Icelandic 
participants of all ages mentioned promise-keeping as the main reason for visiting the old 
friend, while concerns about friendship quality increased with age. Thus, certain (moral) 
concerns gained more importance with age and supplemented “cultural defaults” (friendship 
quality in China, promise-keeping in Iceland) in the respective cultures. When reasoning 
about why one should choose the new classmate, Chinese participants of all ages referred to 
altruism towards the third person, whereas, across ages, Icelandic participants mainly 
referred to self-interest (Keller et al., 1998).  
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These findings are in line with other research showing that children’s and 
adolescents’ (moral) reasoning about friendship differs according to the individualism or 
collectivism of societies (Santana, Silot & Schneider, 2004). Individualistic cultures tend to 
promote individual goals, which may be inconsistent with the responsibilities of an intimate 
relationship such as friendship (Entralgo, 1985). Conversely, collectivistic cultures value 
respect for others and maintenance of harmonious relationships, which may be inconsistent 
with individual goals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  
The unidimensionality assumption of the “individualism-collectivism” concept has 
received much criticism as these terms have been used pejoratively and their meaning may 
present negative connotations across cultures (Kagitçibasi, 1997). As an alternative, 
Triandis (1995) described individualism and collectivism as polythetic constructs: 
Individualism and collectivism may be either horizontal (emphasizing equality) or vertical 
(emphasizing hierarchy). Horizontal individualism emphasizes uniqueness, vertical 
individualism achievement orientation, horizontal collectivism cooperativeness, and vertical 
collectivism dutifulness with the in-group. 
Spain has traditionally been characterized as a collectivistic society with a strong 
emphasis on kinship and family (Caro-Baroja, 1992; Fischer, 1999). While more recent 
results from Hofstede’s (2010) research have placed Spain as in the middle of the 
collectivism and individualism dimension (scoring 51, see Hofstede centre webpage; 49 
being an indicator of no clear preference), the data for this study was collected during the 
1990s when Spain was a collectivistic society. Considering collectivism as a polythetic 
construct, Spain in 1990 would be defined as a horizontal collectivistic society (Gouveia, 
Clemente & Espinsosa, 2010), as relationships were understood as being egalitarian. Social 
relationships in Spain were based on communal sharing (e.g., frequently giving presents, 
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behaving altruistically, being generous, perceiving relationships as being eternal) which 
instils a sense of belonging to a social group (Fiske, 1992). 
Previous research on the development of moral reasoning in friendship conducted in 
Spain showed that when interviewed about different moral dilemmas (e.g. involving 
behaviours such as lying, cheating, etc.), younger children tended to reason based on self-
interest, whereas older children’s and adolescents’ moral reasoning was based on societal or 
universal principles (Laorden, 1995; Medrano, 1998).  
 Russia seems to be clearly collectivistic (score 39 in this dimension, Hofstede centre 
webpage). As part of socialist ideology collectivism was “implanted” and children were 
supposed to learn not to transgress rules and to take into account the needs of the group 
rather than of oneself (Vinogradoba, 1989). Considering collectivism as a polythetic 
construct Russia would be defined as vertical collectivistic (Umpleby, 1990, cited in 
Triandis, 1995): Members of a group show high cohesiveness and cooperation with ingroup, 
but not outgroup members (i.e., in-group favouritism), and this in-group cooperation is an 
important duty to fulfil.  
 Kon and Losenkov (1978) showed that Russian 14- to 17-year-olds considered 
intimacy, confidentiality, and stability as very important for an ideal friendship. Gummerum 
and Keller (2008) investigated friendship understanding in children and adolescents from 
Iceland, China, Russia, and the former East Germany. Overall, Russian children and 
adolescents were more likely to define close friendship in terms of positive feelings and 
trust and helping each other than their peers from individualistic societies, particularly 
Iceland.  
To our knowledge, the current study is the first one that compared the moral 
reasoning of children and adolescents from a horizontal-collectivist culture (Spain) and a 
vertical-collectivist culture (Russia). This is a clear innovation to most previous research on 
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moral development which compared children and adolescents from cultures that can be seen 
as rather individualistic (e.g., Iceland, USA) with peers from rather collectivistic cultures 
(e.g., East Asia).  
Hypotheses 
This study drew on the methods used by Keller et al. (1998). Participants were asked 
about their practical decision, moral judgment, and their reasons for their decisions. 
Concerning their decisions, as both Spanish and Russian societies were classified as 
collectivistic, we expected participants from both cultures to choose visiting “the old friend” 
over the “new classmate”, due to the importance of maintaining group well-being and 
relationship harmony in collectivistic cultures (Triandis, 1995). We further expected that 
adolescents would decide to visit the old friend more often than children and would also be 
more likely to regard this as the morally right decision because of the great importance of 
close friendship in adolescence (Berndt & Savin-Williams, 1993). Although previous 
research has shown how Spanish participants tend to integrate the different parties in a 
social dilemma, we expected that  the importance of friendship for adolescents might 
override the Spanish participants’ desire to integrate the old friend and new classmate. 
Therefore, we expected that whereas Spanish children might choose the options of “old 
friend” and “old friend and new classmate” equally often, the “old friend” would be chosen 
more often by Spanish adolescents. 
Concerning participants’ reasons for their choices, in line with previous research 
(Keller et al., 1998), we expected that participants from both cultures would be more likely 
to justify the choice of visiting the “old friend” with reference to friendship obligations 
rather than promise obligations, particularly in the context of moral judgment. However, we 
expected that the use of promise obligations would increase with age (Kohlberg, 1984). 
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Concerning participants’ reasons for choosing the “new classmate”, we expected that 
the use of self-interested reasons would decrease and the use of altruistic reasons would 
increase with age (Eisenberg, 1986). Furthermore, selfish reasons should be used more in 
the context of practical decision, whereas altruistic reasons should be used more in the 
context of moral judgment. Gummerum and Keller (2008) showed that Russian children and 
adolescents were more likely to define their friendships in terms of altruistic help than peers 
from Western Europe. Therefore, Russian participants should refer altruistic reasons more 
than their Spanish peers. Finally, in line with previous research (Keller et al., 2008), we did 
not expect gender differences.  
Method 
Participants 
Four-hundred and fifty two 7-, 9-, 12- and 15-year-old children and adolescents 
participated: 208 from Spain (26 females, 26 males per age group) and 244 from Russia (30 
female and 30 male 7-year-olds, 30 female and 32 male 9-year-olds, 32 female and 30 male 
12-year-olds, 30 female and 30 male 15-year-olds). Data was collected in the 1990s. 
Participants were recruited from public schools in Madrid and Moscow, which served 
middle-class communities (e.g., white-collar employees, self-employed, public-sector 
employees). Parental consent was prior to the study.   
Procedure 
Participants were interviewed individually at their school for about 20 minutes by 
trained researchers and graduate students. All interviews were tape-recorded and 
transcribed. Participants’ moral reasoning was assessed with a hypothetical dilemma 
situation that conceptualized a morally relevant conflict in a friendship relationship (Keller 
et al., 1998). As discussed before, the main protagonist has promised to visit his/her best 
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friend. Later, the protagonist receives an attractive invitation from another classmate. The 
gender of the characters in the story was matched to the gender of the participant. 
 A number of norms or obligations and subjective interests conflict in this story: the 
normative aspect of the promise given to the friend; interpersonal and empathic /altruistic 
responsibilities for the friend (the friends always meet on the same day, friend wants to talk) 
and for the new classmate (classmate just moved and does not have any friends); hedonistic 
self-interests (new toys/CD of friend vs. the attractive offer by the new classmate). From a 
more comprehensive interview two questions were selected. They could be reworded to get 
a full understanding of participants’ reasoning: 
Practical decision. What does the protagonist decide to do? Why?  
Moral judgment. What is the right thing to do in this situation? Why? 
Coding 
Participants’ answers concerning their practical decision and moral judgment were 
coded into the categories “visiting the friend”, “going with the new classmate,” or “doing 
something with both friend and new classmate.” Justifications for participants’ practical 
decision and moral judgment for the option “visiting the friend” were coded according to the 
following categories (see Keller et al., 1998). 
 Friendship obligations. Refers to the special characteristics of the friendship 
relationship in terms of shared feelings (e.g., “they have known each other for a 
long time”, “they have always trusted each other”) and the expectations and 
ideas of how one ought to treat each other in a friendship (e.g., “one should not 
leave the old friend behind”, “one should always be faithful to an old friend”).  
 Promise obligation. Refers to the normative expectations relating to the promise 
given (e.g. “because she promised”, “he shouldn’t break his word”). 
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Justifications for the practical decision and moral judgment of “going with the new 
classmate” were coded into the following categories (Keller, et al., 1998). 
 Self-interest. Refers to the attractiveness of the material offer (e.g., “she wants 
to see the movie”, “it’s the last showing”) or the new classmate and relationship 
(e.g., “she wants to play with the new classmate”, “he wants to get a new 
friend”).  
 Altruism. Refers to the specific situation, needs, and feelings of the new 
classmate and a desire to alleviate his/her situation (e.g., “must help someone 
who is new”, “show consideration for the new students”). 
Participants’ statements could be coded into more than one category, if it contained 
more than one of the reasons mentioned above. Thus, the unit of analysis was the number of 
exclusive reasons a participant mentioned in his or her answer to the interview questions. 
Two independent coders coded 10 interviews per age group and culture. Inter-rater 
agreement was very good with Cohen’s κ = .78. 
Statistical Analyses 
We computed a set of log-linear analyses (see Wickens, 1989).  First, a saturated 
hierarchical log-linear (hi-log-linear) procedure was run to find the most parsimonious final 
model. A final model having a value greater than p = .05 is considered to be fitting. The 
model fit (2) of the hi-log-linear procedure is presented in the text. To estimate single 
parameters (z values), a log-linear model was computed.  
Results 
As the cell frequencies for the use of some categories were rather low, participants 
were pooled, creating the variable “age” with values “children” (7- and 9-year-olds) and 
“adolescents” (12- and 15-year-olds). 
Decisions  
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As shown in Table 1, the majority of participants chose visiting the old friend over 
going to the movie with the new classmate. Many Spanish participants picked the 
integration option (“both old friend and new classmate”), whereas none of the Russian 
participants did. Because of observed cell frequencies of zero for the integration option for 
Russian participants, we ran hi-log-linear and log-linear analyses separately for both 
cultures. For the Spanish sample, variables included in the analyses were decision [friend 
(r), new classmate, both friend and classmate], age [children (r), adolescents], gender 
[females (r), males], and context [practical decision (r), moral judgment], with r indicating 
the reference category of each factor for the z value. The hi-log-linear analyses produced the 
final model of Decision × Age and Decision × Context, 2 = 5.43, df = 3, p = .14. Table 2 
presents the significant effects (partial chi-squares) and corresponding parameter 
estimations (z values) for the log-linear analyses. As shown in Figure 1, in the context of 
practical decisions, a majority of Spanish participants, and particularly adolescents, chose 
the option “old friend” over “new classmate” and the integration option. However, in the 
context of moral judgment, all Spanish participants, but particularly adolescents, were more 
likely to choose the option “both friend and new classmate” over the two other options.    
For the Russian sample, variables included in the analyses were decision [friend (r), 
new classmate], age [children (r), adolescents], gender [females (r), males], and context 
[practical decision (r), moral judgment]. The hi-log-linear analyses produced the final model 
of Decision × Age, 2 = 6.72, df = 12, p = .88. Adolescents were more likely to choose the 
option “old friend” than children (Tables 1, 2). 
Reasons for decisions  
Variables included in the hi-log-linear and log-linear analyses were content category 
[not chosen (r), chosen], age [children (r), adolescent], culture [Spain (r), Russia], gender 
[females (r), males], and context [practical (r), moral judgment], with r indicating the 
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reference category. Table 2 displays the significant effects (partial chi-squares) and 
corresponding parameter estimations (z values) for the log-linear analyses.   
Reasons for choosing “old friend”. Participants from both cultures and age groups 
used friendship obligations more often than promise obligations when justifying why the 
protagonist opted for visiting the old friend (Table 1).  
The hi-log-linear analysis for friendship obligations produced the final model of 
Friendship obligation × Age × Context × Culture, 2 = 6.91, df = 16, p = .98. The category 
friendship obligations was used relatively infrequently in the Spanish sample, except for 
Spanish adolescents in the context of their practical decisions. In Russia, participants used 
the category friendship obligations rather frequently, except for children in the context of 
moral judgment (Figure 2). Regarding age, adolescents referred to friendship obligations 
more often than children. Concerning culture participants from Russia referred to friendship 
obligations more often than participants from Spain. Finally, concerning context friendship 
obligations were used significantly more often in the context of practical decisions than in 
the context of moral judgment (Figure 2).  
The hi-log-linear analysis for promise obligation produced the final model of 
Promise obligation × Age × Context × Culture, 2 = 7.44, df = 16, p = .96. However, the 
log-linear analyses did not produce any significant interactions with the variable promise 
obligation. Inspection of Table 1 reveals that promise obligations were used to a similar 
degree across age groups and cultures.  
Reasons for choosing “new classmate”. Concerning self-interested reasons, the hi-
log-linear analysis produced the final model of Self-Interest × Age × Context, and Self-
interest × Culture, 2 = 16.34, df = 21, p = .75. Both Spanish and Russian participants 
referred to self-interest more often in the context of practical decisions (Figure 3). 
Regarding age, self-interested reasons were used more frequently by children than by 
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adolescents. Concerning culture, Russian participants referred to self-interested reasons 
much more frequently than Spanish participants in their practical decision-making (Tables 
1, 2). Finally, regarding context self-interested reason were used more frequently in 
practical decisions than moral judgment.  
Concerning altruistic reasons, the hi-log-linear model produced the final model of 
Altruism × Age,  Altruism × Context, and Altruism × Culture, 2 = 4.58, df = 8, p = .80. The 
log-linear analysis (Table 2) showed that regarding age altruistic reasons were used 
significantly more often by adolescents than by children. Concerning culture, Russian 
participants referred to altruism more often than Spanish participants. Finally, regarding 
context, altruistic reasons were used more often in the context of moral judgment than 
practical decision.   
Discussion 
This study examined whether children’s and adolescents’ practical decisions and 
moral reasoning about a friendship dilemma would be affected by culture. We investigated 
this question in two cross-sectional samples of 7- and 9-year-olds (children) and 12- and 15-
year-olds (adolescents) Spanish and Russian participants. Spain and Russia have been 
described as integrating different features of collectivism. Specifically, Spanish culture has 
been labeled as horizontal collectivistic and Russian culture as vertical collectivistic 
(Triandis, 1995).  
Participants’ cultural backgroundaffected their practical and moral choices. In line 
with the assumption of vertical collectivism, which is characterized by keeping strong bonds 
between the members of the in-group (in that case, the old friend) but not with members of 
the out-group (i.e., the new classmate; Tirandis, 1995), Russian participants chose the option 
“old friend” significantly more often than the option “new classmate”, and none of the 
Russian participants chose the integration option of “both old friend and new classmate”. 
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Furthermore, consistent with the growing importance of friendship for adolescents (Berndt 
& Savin-Williams, 1993), the preference for the option “old friend” increased in 
adolescents. Spanish participants were more likely than their Russian peers to integrate the 
concerns of the old friend and the new classmate (Medrano, 1998). Hence, in line with the 
assumption of “horizontal collectivism” Spanish participants strive to seek a solution for all 
involved parties and try to create harmonious relationships between the three peers. The 
integration option (“old friend and new classmate”) thus represents the “cultural default” for 
Spaniards. While we expected that this cultural default would be overridden by a preference 
to choose the old friend in Spanish adolescents, our actual results were more complex. 
Specifically, in the context of moral judgment, the majority of Spanish children, and 
particularly adolescents indicated that the cultural default (integrating the concerns of old 
friend and new classmate) was the morally right choice. Only in the context of practical 
choice did a majority of Spanish children, and particularly adolescents, opt for the old 
friend. As discussed by Keller et al. (1998), individuals do not just passively adopt the 
norms and “defaults” of their culture, but they actively construct them on the basis of their 
experiences and interactions. Actual experiences with peers and friends might modify 
cultural defaults and may have led Spanish adolescents to choose the old friend in their 
practical decisions. It would be interesting to investigate whether those who acted against 
the cultural default and their moral judgment and chose the old friend in their practical 
decision might experience negative emotions because of this cultural norm violation (e.g., 
Malti & Keller, 2009).  
In addition to their practical decisions and moral judgments, we asked participants 
for the reasons for their choices. As expected, visiting the “old friend” was mainly justified 
with reference to friendship obligations. Keller et al. (1998) showed that children’s and 
adolescents’ moral reasoning and decision-making in collectivistic cultures is strongly 
CULTURE AND MORAL REASONING  15 
 
motivated by social duties towards close others. This sense of obligation towards the old 
friend increases in adolescence when friends and peers become the most important people in 
adolescents’ lives (Brown, 1990). Compared to their Spanish peers, Russian participants’ 
more frequent use of friendship obligation reasons may be explained by them understanding 
friendship relationships as being based on the duties of loyalty and faithfulness, which is 
coherent with Russia’s classification as a vertical collectivistic society. While previous 
research (e.g., Keller et al., 1998) has also found that friendship obligations were more often 
used in the context of practical decision than moral judgment, this is still a surprising result. 
It is possible that a reference to friendship obligations can be seen as a “good enough” 
reason in the practical decision-making context, whereas additional (normative) reasons 
might have to be employed in the context of moral judgment. 
The decision to visit the “old friend” was rarely justified with reference to promise 
obligations in both samples. On the one hand, this is in line with previous studies which 
have shown that general normative concerns, such as promise keeping, are more likely to be 
employed as justifications by children and adolescents from individualistic than 
collectivistic societies (Chaparro et al., 2013; Keller et al., 1998). On the other hand, this 
research reported, also in collectivistic cultures, an increasing use of general normative 
concerns with age, a result we could not replicate in this study. Clearly, practical and moral 
decision-making in friendship is strongly based on principles of solidarity, loyalty, and care 
in Spain and Russia. This might be due to how friendship is conceptualized in these 
societies. Krappmann (1996) points out that the Spanish word for friendship (“amistad”) has 
its roots in the Latin word for love; thus the word “friendship” in Spanish implies a basic 
and intense affection. Similarly, the Russian “drujba” implies closeness, comradeship, and 
company. Thus, at least linguistically, friendship in both Spain and Russia was based on 
affection and closeness and less on normative aspects. 
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Only a minority of participants from both societies picked the new classmate in their 
practical choice and moral judgment. The use of altruistic reasons for these choices tended 
to increase with age, whereas self-interest decreased (Eisenberg, 1986; Kohlberg, 1984). 
Consistent with our predictions, choosing the new classmate was mainly justified with self-
interest in the context of practical decision and with altruism in the context of moral 
judgment. Furthermore, while for Russian participants going with the new classmate might 
sometimes be morally defensible for altruistic reasons, their practical decisions were more 
strongly based on self-interest. It might be that the prospect of going to a movie/pop concert 
might have been much more attractive to Russian than to Spanish participants in 1990, 
given the different economic states of the two countries at the time (see Gummerum & 
Keller, 2012).  
 This study highlights the fact that moral reasoning is affected by cultural differences. 
One interesting finding in this paper is the clear difference in the choice of the integration 
option between the Russian and the Spanish participants. However, this result might also be 
explained by social desirability. As discussed before, relationships in Spain are understood 
as egalitarian and based on communal interest (Fiske, 1992). It would have been interesting 
to include other questions (e.g. ‘what do you think other people may think about your 
decision?’) to test whether decisions were based on self-interest (i.e., social recognition) or 
altruism. Furthermore, we cannot know whether the differences found for participants’ 
socio-moral reasoning correspond to their real behaviour when interacting with friends. 
Therefore, future research should use a multi-method approach (e.g., interviews, 
observations, behavioral tasks) to elucidate cultural and age differences in moral reasoning 
and its relationship to behaviour, and to overcome a possible social desirability bias.  
Another interesting venue would be the collection of current data to study if there are 
differences with the data of the current study (collected in the 1990s). It is possible that 
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Spain and Russia may have evolved into a more individualistic society. Such results were 
found in previous research (e.g., Gummerum & Keller, 2012) where the sociomoral 
reasoning of East German children and adolescents was compared in 1990 and 2005.  
The main goal of this study was to understand differences in moral reasoning in two 
cultural contexts which have been described as collectivistic. In line with polythetic 
conceptions of collectivism (Triandis, 1995), we found that Spanish participants tend to 
consider both parties involved in the dilemma (i.e. old friend and new classmate), whereas 
Russian participants did not. Both Spanish and Russian participants used friendship 
obligation reasons. However, Russian participants used self-interest and altruism reasons 
more when justifying the choice of ´going with the new friend´. These results emphasize the 
importance of conducting more fine-grained analyses when comparing the effect of culture 
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Table 1 
Frequencies (Percentages) of Content Categories Used in Practical Decision and Moral 
Reasoning in Friendship Dilemma  
 Spain Russia 
 Children Adolescents Children Adolescents 
 
  Choosing option “old friend”   42(40%) 52(50%) 32(52%) 49(79%) 
    Practical decision 24 (46%) 38 (73%) 40 (64%) 48 (79%) 
    Moral decision 18 (35%) 14 (27%) 41 (66%) 51 (84%) 
  Reasons for option “old friend” 
    Friendship obligation 21 (20%) 43 (41%) 86 (69%) 101 (83%) 
    Promise obligation 12 (15%) 9 (9%) 18 (15%) 17 (14%) 
  Choosing option “new   
  classmate” 
19 (18%) 8 (8%) 26 (42%) 9 (15%) 
    Practical decision 15 (29%) 6 (12%) 20 (33%) 10 (17%) 
    Moral decision 4 (8%) 2 (4%) 15 (24%) 5 (10%) 
  Reasons for option “new classmate” 
    Self-interest 14 (14%) 6 (6%) 52 (42%) 43 (35%) 
    Altruism 3 (3%) 4 (4%) 21 (17%) 6 (5%) 
  Choosing option “both friend   
  and new classmate” 
38 (37%) 44 (42%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
    Practical decision 13 (25%) 8 (15%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
    Moral decision 25 (48%)        36 (69%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
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Table 2 
Results of Log-Linear Analyses for Decisions and Reasoning in Friendship Dilemma 
Effects and interactions Df Partial χ2 p z value 
Decision in friendship dilemma - Spain  
   Decision × Age × Context 2 6.51 .04 n.s. 
   











Decision in friendship dilemma - Russia     
   Decision × Age 1 8.75 .003 -2.88 
Reasons for option “old friend” 
  Friendship obligations 
    Content Category × Age  
        × Culture × Context 
1 4.95 .03 3.56 
    Content Category × Age 1 17.63 .001 4.01 
    Content Category × Context 









Reasons for option “new classmate” 
  Self-interest     
    Content Category × Context × Culture 1 4.95 .03 -3.03 
    Content Category × Age  1 4.21 .04 -2.40 
    Content Category × Context 1 98.04 .001 -7.44 
    Content Category × Culture 1 65.68 .001 6.13 
  Altruism 
    Content Category × Age  1 6.65 .01 -2.10 
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Effects and interactions Df Partial χ2 p z value 
    Content Category × Culture 1 10.62 .001 2.73 
    Content Category × Context 1 8.75 .003 -2.53 
Note: Note that the number of z values corresponds to the degrees of freedom of the tested 



















Figure 1. Spanish children’s and adolescents’ option choices for the contexts of (a) practical 
decisions and (b) moral judgments. 
 
Figure 2. Use of reasons referring to friendship obligations when choosing the option “old 
friend” in (a) Spain and (b) Russia. 
 
Figure 3. Use of reasons referring to self-interest when choosing the option “new classmate” 
across cultures and contexts. 
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